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KIERKEGAARD AND THE PARADOXICAL
LOGIC OF WORLDLY FAITH
Ronald L. Hall

I argue here that Kierkegaardian faith is essentially, albeit paradoxically,
worldly-that Kierkegaardian faith is a form of world-affirmation. A correlate of this
claim is that faithlessness of any kind is ultimately a form of aesthetic resignation
grounded in a deep seated world-alienation. The paradox of faith's worldliness is
found in the fact that, for Kierkegaard, faith both excludes and includes resignation
in itself. I make sense of this paradox by appealing to Kierkegaard's idea of "an
annulled possibility," and conclude that faith's love of the world is an affirmation via
a double negation.
Most commentators would agree that at every turn Kierkegaard's thinking is
essentially paradoxical. This recognition and acknowledgment, however,
does not get us very far unless we are able to find and to express the precise
and peculiar logic of paradox that dominates Kierkegaard's mind. To this end,
I offer the following reading of Kierkegaard's logic of paradox.
I

It is not difficult to say what a paradox, or more precisely, a paradoxical
relation is. It is a peculiar kind of dialectical relation in which a positive
reality is taken to include within itself what it, by its very nature, excludes.
The dialectic of paradox is different from a Hegelian dialectic as follows: in
Hegel, the tension of the negation of thesis and antithesis is relieved in a
synthesis; in the dialectic of paradox, opposites form a structural unity in
which the tension of negation is accentuated not resolved. 1
Kierkegaard's writings are replete with such paradoxical dialectical unities:
despair, for example, is a structural element within faith even though faith
excludes it;2 spirit includes sensuality within itself by virtue of excluding it;3
the possibility of being a self both includes and excludes the possibility of
not being a self;4etc.
.
While simply stating the definition of a paradoxical relation is fairly easy,
making sense of such a relation is quite another matter. How can a relational
reality include within itself what it excludes? This seems to defy logic and
has led some to conclude that Kierkegaard, and anyone else that thinks paradoxically, is an irrationalist. 5 I, however, want to argue otherwise.
I contend that there is indeed a logic of paradox and that it is disclosed in
Kierkegaard's notion of "an annulled possibility.,,6 I will take his concept of
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an annulled possibility to explain how it makes sense for a positive relational
reality to include within itself what it also excludes from itself.
Specifically, I will focus on the conception of faith that Kierkegaard-via
his pseudonym Johannes de Silenti0 7 -develops in Fear and Trembling. 8 I
will argue that for Kierkegaard resignation is a structural element within faith.
Or to put the matter more paradoxically, I will argue that resignation is a
permanent possibility within faith, but always an annulled (negated, excluded) possibility.

II
In the logic of the Kierkegaardian framework, to exist as spirit, as self, is to
live in faith, to live as a knight of faith. Moreover, to live as a knight of faith
is to take up a certain kind of relation to God and to the world. This dual
relation has both a religious and an ethical component. The knight of faith's
relation to God is a religious matter; his relation to the world, his neighbor,
is a matter of ethics. Because it requires both components, I will say that the
life of faith constitutes for Kierkegaard an ethico-religious modality of existence.
The paradox of such an ethico-religious faith is found, I claim, in the fact
that it both includes and excludes within itself the possibility of taking up
alternative postures toward the world. Grasping the paradoxical role that
these alternatives play within faith is essential for understanding the nature
of the self-world relation that the knight of faith is called upon to enter-essential, that is, for grasping that Kiekegaardian faith is fundamentally, albeit
paradoxically, a worldly faith.
It is easy to provide some cryptic glosses of the paradoxical relation to the
world that the knight of faith enters: her's is the most spiritual modality of
existence and at the same time the most worldly mode of existence; she at
once transcends the world and is essentially incarnate within it; she exists in
such a way that every moment of her life includes within itself two mutually
exclusive components, transcendence and immanence, both at the same time. 9
If such easy characterizations are to have substance, however, we must specify more precisely the logic of such a paradoxical worldly faith.
To do this, we must first adumbrate the class of relations that a human
being can take up vis a vis the world that constitute the alternatives to the
ethico-religious relation of faith. The Kierkegaardian alternatives to faith are
well known: they are aesthetical, ethical, and religious alternatives. I will
diverge in the following from this tripartite analysis in two ways.
First, in place of the usual analyses of these modalities of existence, I
propose the following reinterpretation: I contend that common to all of these
alternatives to faith is the structural element of resignation. This interpretation differs from the usual insofar as the single self-world movement of
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resignation is associated almost exclusively by Kierkegaard himself with the
religious alternative to faith, namely, religiousness A. After a discussion of
resignation as it is at play in the story of Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac, I will
argue that resignation also is an essential feature-but more subtlety-of
Kierkegaard's description of the ethical modality as a form of existence that
is preoccupied with the task of realizing the universal.
Secondly, I want to add another twist to the usual interpretation of
Kierkegaard's stages. Instead of the usual three-fold, or multi-fold analyses
of the stages, I will follow a two-fold schema that is a modification of the
two-fold analysis that I learned from Stephen Crites. lO Crites proposes that
there are only two basic modes of existence for Kierkegaard, namely, the
aesthetic and the existential. I will accept this dichotomy with this amendment: unlike Crites, I will not take the ethical or religiousness A to fall within
the existential. Rather, I will say that the ethical and religiousness A, as well
as the aesthetical per se, are but variations of a basically aesthetic existence.
As well, I will take it that for Kierkegaard the only properly existential
modality of existence is the ethico-religious modality of faith (religiousness
B).

Accordingly, I read Kierkegaard as proposing at least three variations
within the aesthetic alternative to faith: (l) a purely aesthetic relation of
hovering detachment from historical particularity achieved via a flight from
responsible ethical choice/action and the attachments to the world such a
responsible existence entails; (2) an aesthetico-ethical relation of what may
appear to be an ethical attachment to the world, an attachment based on a
choice/act in which the concrete historical actuality is fully and responsibly
embraced, but which turns out to be a relation that is simply another, albeit
veiled, form of world-detachment: in an aesthetico-ethical existence, attachments to historical particularity are made only insofar as they serve as the
concrete occasions for manifesting a higher, deeper, a more absolute attachment-an attachment to abstract, timeless, eternal, universal, ethical principles; (3) an aesthetico-religious relation of detachment (religiousness A) from
historical particularity-a detachment which may be based on a recognition
of the failure of the aesthetico-ethical to realize the universal within the muck
and mire of concrete historical actuality. It is just the failure of the aestheticoethical project of making the abstract universal principle absolute, of making
the relative, the temporal, the concrete particular, and so forth, conform to
timeless, abstract generalizations-the failed attempt at absolutizing the relative-that leads the knight of infinite resignation to seek a more perfect world
elsewhere. All of these self-world relations stand in contrast to the self-world
relation proposed by ethico-religious faith insofar as only in the latter do we
find a true, albeit paradoxical, affirmation of our existence within the finite
historical world.
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Because I think that in the final analysis there is for Kierkegaard only one
fully existential modality of human being, namely, faith, I adopt the convention of designating the alternatives to faith as hyphenated forms of aestheticism. And because I am convinced that faith for Kierkegaard implies a
genuine love of the world, and hence an ethical engagement in it, I designate
faith as an ethico-religious modality.
I say that resignation is a common element to all forms of aestheticism
because I take the single self-world movement of resignation to be a retreat
from, a transcendence of, our worldly human existence, our embodiment in
time and place, and so forth. Such a desire to transcend the human II takes
many routes, but as one Kierkegaard commentator has recently put it, all of
these are forms of disengagement. 12 The drive to take up such an aesthetic
posture of disengagement is contempt-a deep-seated contempt for worldly
human life, a contempt generated by the inevitable disappointments, sufferings, losses, vulnerabilities, broken promises, and so forth, that are intrinsically attendant to a fragile worldly human existence.
One of the burdens of my argument here is to show that- contra Crites
and most others-the ethical is but a variation within the aesthetical modality.
I assume that while most would agree that the pure aesthete simply hovers
above the world in a perpetual flight from worldly commitment, and that the
knight of infinite resignation withdraws from the world in spiritual transcendence, the general consensus is that, for Kierkegaard, the ethical is a worldly
form of existence that takes seriously the existential force of personal choice
and responsibility. I take it, however, that the ethical for Kierkegaard is
ultimately an aesthetico-ethical modality, insofar as "the ethical person," for
him, like the knight of infinite resignation, attempts to transcend the temporal
world of historical particularity: the former would transform the temporal
world into conformity with the abstract timeless principles of the ethical
absolutes; the latter would simply withdraw from the historical world via a
spiritual technique of denial.
These forms of aestheticism differ radically from faith. In both aestheticoethical and aesthetico-religious existence, there is but a single self-world
movement. In both cases, there is a giving up, or better, a giving up on, the
finite historical world. Accordingly, I call the aesthetico-ethical modality a
form of resignation, even in the face of "ethical" pretensions, such as Judge
William's, of worldly responsibility and concern. Faith, however, is rcally
world-affirming insofar as it consists of two self-world movements: faith is
a matter of recognizing the possibility of being able to give up the finite
temporal world and our human existence within it, and of recognizing that
only on such condition are we able truly to affirm it, to affirm our existence
w:thin it.
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But let me leave the matter of ethics for a moment and turn to a closer
analysis of the aesthetico-religious, especially its conception of existence as
a spiritual resignation from the world.

III
As I interpret Kierkegaard, faith is not a completion of resignation but must
be radically distinguished from it; faith is not simply a matter of adding a
second step to the first step of world-denial. The knight of infinite resignation
does not fail because he does not go far enough, he goes in the wrong
direction completely (Fl,48). Here is where I find the paradox of faith: faith
goes in a direction that is the opposite from resignation: resignation is a form
of transcending the world, faith a form of embracing it; as such, faith excludes
resignation. At the same time, faith includes resignation as a structural element within itself insofar as faith would be impossible if resignation were
not a real existential possibility (FT,46). Or as I would put it, faith includes
resignation within itself as an annulled possibility.
Again allow me some general glosses on the distinction between faith and
religious resignation beyond those given by Silentio (FT,46ff): resignation is
a technique, but faith is not; resignation is a way of mastering time, faith is
not. Faith is a real attachment to history, to finitude, to the world, to others,
resignation is world-transcendence. Faith makes full and unequivocal worldly
claims in the full awareness of the vulnerabilities, risks, threats, mortality,
fortune, and uncertainties of worldly existence, resignation forswears all proprietary claims. Unlike the knight of resignation, the knight of faith does not
rise above, even inwardly, finitude or historical temporality; unlike the knight
of resignation, the knight of faith lives in commitment to the historical actuality; indeed, she is fully aware that the context of historical particularity
provides the conditions of the possibility of faith's full realization.
But these broad characterizations need unpacking. For this let us turn our
focus to Kierkegaard's interpretation of the biblical story of Abraham's call
to sacrifice his only son Isaac.
While we cannot forget that Isaac is Abraham's son, his only son, we must
remember that in the biblical story and in Kierkegaard's interpretation of it,
he is also a symbol of worldly attachments in general. Does the story aim to
tell us that Abraham's attachment to Isaac is wrong? that worldly attachments
in general are wrong? Does Abraham care too much for Isaac? the world? It
has seemed to some that Abraham's love for his son is wrong, that Abraham
is guilty of possessiveness, a kind of will-to-power, a desire to control his
son. God is not only out to humble Abraham, to knock him down a peg or
two, he also wants to teach him the lesson of how fathers must learn to let
their children go, to liberate them from parental proprietary claims, to undo
.
13
possess! veness.
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I do not think that Kierkegaard thinks that Abraham is guilty of loving his
son too possessivelY-Df making inappropriate claims on him; or that he is
in some way guilty of idolatry, or guilty of absolutizing "the relative." Indeed,
Abraham never hesitated one moment in obeying God's command to sacrifice
Isaac; and never did he flinch one moment in believing that God would fulfill
his promise to him that he would be the father of a great nation. As I see it,
Abraham does not need to be humbled, or knocked down, for he is from the
beginning to the end a knight of faith.
What then is the point of the story of the sacrifice? What is it that God is
trying to teach Abraham? I suggest that he is not trying to get Abraham to
put an inward distance between himself and his son, as though God suspected
that Isaac may be interfering with Abraham's faith, as though he suspected
that Abraham was becoming too attached to finitude. Rather, and to the
contrary, I claim that it is precisely the point of the story that God is attempting to deepen Abraham's attachment to finitude, to his son, to historical
particularity, to this wOrld. 14 He does this not by instructing Abraham to love
and care without making proprietary claims, but by teaching him two lessons
of faith. The first lesson is that faith does not demand that he withdraw his
claim on his son; rather, that he deepen it! This deepening of his claim on
his son is a matter of particularizing it: "Faith is the paradox that the single
individual is higher than the universal" (FT,55). This particularizing is an
element within Abraham's deepening awareness of his own (and Isaac's)
personal presence. He realizes that God is calling him (in the first person) to
make his claim on Isaac also in the first person; he realizes that God is calling
him to make his son all the more his own.
The biblical text and context make it perfectly clear that the particularity
of first person presence is a central element of the story. As the account has
it, Abraham is repeatedly addressed in his own name (by God, by Isaac, by
the angel) and he repeatedly responds in the first person present: "Here am
I." Context suggests that the biblical story intends to present God's address
as directed to this single individual, who is faced with (the threat of the loss
of) another single individual, his own, his only, son.
Another way to put this is to say that the lesson God would teach Abraham
and us about faith is that it is not a techne for transcending the contingencies
and vulnerabilities of historical particularity, of worldly human existence. To
live in faith is not to live above the threat of loss, of suffering, of death; it is
not to live inured to change, unaffected by chance events that lie beyond our
control, beyond our choice. Or more concretely put, the lesson that
Kierkegaard would teach me, through the story of Abraham, is that to live in
faith, I must choose-in full recognition of its fragilities and vulnerabilities-my own humanity among others; I must really invest myself fully and
without reservation in the concrete, finite, historical actuality. To live in faith
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requires that I recognize and welcome my worldly condition among others
as my own, that I do not resign myself to it or from it as an inevitable
limitation of my human being or to my being truly human.
The second lesson is that such a personal claiming is ongoing, indeed, that
it is a continual claiming; or what amounts to the same thing, the second
lesson is that faith is repetition! This wholehearted embrace of the world that
the knight of faith engages in is something that she must continually choose;
faith is an intrinsically temporal modality of existence. The faithful reception
of the world from the hands of the Eternal presupposes an ongoing possibility
of doing otherwise-an ever-present temptation not to receive it. Moreover,
this temptation to turn away from the world in resignation-perhaps just
because we know we can-never goes away. But this is necessarily so, since
faith is a choice and choice presupposes a context of temporal possibility.
It would have been easy for Abraham to have come to rest with the birth
of Isaac in the belief that now everything was safe, that the fulfillment of
God's promise had effectively ended anxiety, indeed, even ended the need
for further faith. IS But faith is not like this, God instructs, it is not a momentary, once-far-all choice, an emergency measure to get us through some crisis
of uncertainty, some passing anxiety. The fact is, human existence is intrinsically subject to possibility, and hence to anxiety, to vulnerability, to loss.
The faithful self docs not put these elements to rest, she plunges forward
through them. The faithful self is continually called to embrace the world in
all of its fragility, for she recognizes that it is, at any moment, in her power
to refuse. The knight knows that such a refusal would bring with it a form of
existence that would be other than human; to this possibility she must continually say "no!".
And so we arrive at the truth of resignation. We can own or truly possess
something only if we have chosen it in the first person; such a choice always
implies a context of historical possibility and hence repetition; and finally,
we can own or truly possess only what it is possible for us to disown, to
dispossess, to resign. This last point focuses the paradoxical aspect of faith:
while resignation is not faith, faith must include resignation within itself as
an ever-present possibility that the knight of faith must be prepared continually to annul.
This is the paradoxical thing about human beings: we do not have to accept
our humanness. We can turn away, resign from our humanness so to speak,
seek to live in eternity as gods or angels, rising above the vulnerabilities of
historical time and finitude, or otherwise block out historical consciousness
by sinking into the brute immediacy of a series of discrete moments. But this
fact, this possibility of resignation, the human possibility of not being human,
the temptation to a kind of spiritual other-worldliness, profoundly qualifies
the prospect of the embrace of the human and of the human world.
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My claim is that the full existential import of Abraham's embrace of Isaac,
or more generally the full import of the faithful embrace of the world, comes
in the concrete, existential recognition of the fact that we have the power to
do otherwise; it is this power to do otherwise that is a permanent possibility
within faith, a possibility faith must continually annul. Faith requires that the
faithful knight continually say "no" to what is within his power to say "yes"
to; yet the awareness of this requirement to say "no" to resignation is dependent on the awareness of the possibility of a "yes." The knight of infinite
resignation embraces the "no" to human existence, says "yes" to the temptation to resign from it, to flee from its hurts, its fragility; he says ."yes" to the
temptation to disown it, to give it up. Yet this possibility of resignation is an
element necessary for faith to be vested with it full personal, existential,
significance.
Abraham realized that it was possible for him to give up all that was dear
to him. He found out, with God's help, that he could do it, that he could raise
the knife, that he had the resources, the freedom, the power, to resign, to give
up his son. And this he realized even though he never stopped believing that
God would be good to his promises. And further he realized that the possibility of loss is a permanent element within human life-that the gift of Isaac
would have to be continually received.
Resignation is not something that one passes through to get to faith, leaving
resignation behind for good. It is rather an element within faith, permanently
a threat to it, a possibility that must continually be annulled. The awareness
of the fact that I can, that I have the power to, run away from my fragile
human existence occasions the paradox of human existence: as a human being
I must choose either to embrace or to reject my own humanness. The constant
temptation to search for a way of transcending the world has the paradoxical
effect of occasioning my decision to live in it and to embrace it.

IV
On this line of interpretation, we can draw similar differences between the
aesthetico-ethical and the ethico-religious. Someone who lives within the
aesthetico-ethical, does not fully embrace the particular, nor his own first
person particularity, his own individual uniqueness. And this is so precisely
because he has not learned how to annul the possibility of resignation from
finite particularity-indeed he has found a way to transcend the finite, the
particular-namely, in an absolute attachment to universal ethical principles.
Kierkegaard's Judge William, for example, is married to marriage, to a
nameless wife. As a person, as an other J, she has no place in his defense of
the abstract virtue of marriage. Two moves are unthinkable for the Judge: a
teleological suspension of the ethical and divorce. One of the reasons that
the aesthetico-ethical individual attaches himself absolutely to the universal
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is that this lifts him above the vulnerability and risk of temporality and
contingency. Whatever may happen in the world, he reasons, this eternal
principle holds, this principle is reliable, it covers every possibility. To suspend
the ethical is, on this way of thinking, to become suspended, to loose one's secure
footing and to be toppled by the flux of temporality. From this perspective the
teleological suspension of the ethical is nothing less than madness.
For similar reasons, it is inconceivable that the Judge could seriously contemplate divorce from his nameless wife, or she from him. By virtue of his
unquestionable commitment to his marriage, the Judge is able, so he thinks,
to absolutize the relative. This attempted absolutizing of the relative provides
safety and security, but at the price of robbing the relative of its relativity,
and the particular of its historical particularity. In obedience to the universal,
the aesthetico-ethical individual finds a sure and secure technique for transcending the historical relativity of historical particularity with all of its
inherent risks of loss, its anxieties, uncertainties, frailties, fragilities, and
contingencies.
The absolute commitment to marriage that the Judge shares with his nameless wife is solid through and through. However, the commitment here is not
in the first-person. The Judge has a wife all right, but certainly his defense
of marriage lacks a sense of particularity, of its being his marriage to this
particular woman whose name is ... What is missing from his defense of
marriage is the sense that at some particular time he actually said in his own
name to some other person with a proper name and face to face: "I, William,
take you, (calling her by name), as my wife." Their commitment then seems
not to each other, but to the concept of marriage, to its universal principles
of faithfulness, loyalty, steadfastness, comfort, and honor.
The Judge has given himself away as a disguised aesthete insofar as he has
claimed that he has never experienced any conflict between love and duty,
in fact, no serious marital conflicts whatsoever. Louis Mackey gets to this
issue in a pointed question:
If he [the Judge] assumes that the world will never assault him with forces

too powerful to defeat, then he may well be counting too much on a deeper
harmony of nature and freedom that has not always been evident to hungry
and tormented people. And if his techniques of "internalization" are meant
to cut the Gordian knot of affliction by simply removing to the ideal, then
does he not run the risk of making conjugal love [marriage] quite as abstract
as "first love," or seduction?16
This brings us to the heart and soul of Kierkegaard's critique (via the Priest
from Jutland) of the aesthetico-ethical found in the closing "Ultimatum" of
Either/Or II. Suppose, the Priest asks the Judge to consider, a real ethical
conflict arose between a lover and his beloved, how could this conflict be
resolved? Suppose further that the lover believed himself to be in the right,
and the beloved in the wrong. Will he stick to his principles against his
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beloved? will he do his duty? will he be obedient to some abstract ethical
principle come what may? If he acts out of principle only, then he shows that
it is ethical rectitude that he loves, not the other in her concrete particularity.
If it is really this concrete other person that the lover loves, then he will be
willing to be in the wrong vis a vis the ethical principle, for her sake, for the
sake of their love. Love, marital or otherwise, is, or ought to be, a relation
of radical particularity. As the Priest puts it:
Might it actually be this way? Why did you wish to be in the wrong in relation
to a person? Because you loved. Why did you find it upbuilding? Because
you loved. The more you loved, the less time you had to deliberate upon
whether or not you were in the right; your love had only one desire, that you
might continually be in the wrong (EtO 11,349).

I do not take this willingness to be in the wrong for the sake of the other, for
the sake of the relationship, simply as a form of self-deprecation. Rather, I
take it that the point of Fear and Trembling is being reiterated here, namely,
the point that the particular is higher than the universal. 17 In faith, in an
ethico-religious modality of existence, one's ethical task is to be responsive
to, and hence responsible to, the concrete needs of this other who is a unique
particular individual with a proper name who stands before me here and now.
This is quite different from understanding one's ethical task solely in terms
of being in the right (or the wrong) relative to an abstract ethical principle.
Precisely because neither the Judge nor his wife has appeared to the other
in the first person, that is, appeared to the other as a unique individual bearing
a proper name, the prospect of disappearance in any concrete, existential
sense, is unthinkable. For the Judge, the prospect of disappearance, of divorce, would shatter the rock of marriage for it would focus the issue existentially on his own marriage, on the concrete person to whom he is married,
even if only negatively. (There is a profound sense to the idea of a negative
appearance, in the idea that a person's presence can break through only
negatively in her absence, in the idea that a full-fledged personal presence is
possible only in a context of an actual, or at least the threat of an actual,
·
18)
d Isappearance.
Following the paradoxical logic of Kierkegaard's thought, I would say that
the Judge's marriage-despite William's praise, against the aesthete, of the
importance of choice-is no fully personal choice. The judge has not yet
arrived at Abraham's faith. The Judge has not had to face the existential
pathos that the possibility of the withdrawal of commitment posses. The threat
of the withdrawal of the marriage commitment-the threat of divorce-brings
into full consciousness not only the fragility of its bond but more importantly
the full realization of the fact that the bond is grounded in first person
existential choice. The bond of marriage is only as strong as the two who
jointly consent to it, and continually consent to it, make it. 19
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On my reading, Kierkegaardian faith makes the ethical embrace of the
world more profound, more complete, more truly responsible. The ethical
dimension of the ethico-religious modality of faith is focused on the particular,zo it is an ethics of responsibility. To live within such a faith is just to live
within a full awareness of my own and the other's radical concrete particularity. My responsibility to the other in an ethics of particularity is so concrete, so tied to the historical here and now, to the contingencies of historical
actuality, that the aesthetico-ethical individual, lost as he is in the abstract
universal, is not able fully to realize it.
To Ii ve concretely as spirit is to be enabled to be absolutely committed to
the relative (the particular) without falling into the idolatry of absolutizing
it. What guards against such an absolutizing of the particular is the concrete
realization of the possibility of resignation. The element of resignation brings
with it the knowledge that our commitments to the particular do not necessarily entail its absolutization so long as we continually realize that they are
our own commitments, commitments we make in our own name, and therefore commitments from which we are free to withdraw. Resignation is thus
always at play within faith (like the possibility of divorce in marriage); it is
always a possibility, a real possibility, a terrifying possibility, but a possibility
that faith (and a good marriage) somehow-miraculously perhaps-is able
continually to annul.
The aesthete says "no" to the finite historical world, to concrete particularity, but so do the aesthetico-ethical and the aesthetico-religious "individuals." All live within the single movement of resignation; within the
single-minded drive toward the goal of transcending the world of historical
particularity, of transcending the human. The knight of faith, however, does
not simply say "yes" to the world, to his own humanness among others within
it: rather, he realizes that in order freely and of his own choice to say this
"yes" he must first concretely face the possibility of saying "no." The condition of the possibility of my making the world and my own humanness
within it my own is the realization that I have the power to do otherwise. The
knight of faith says "no" to this possibility of saying "no;" his "no" annuls
the possibility of saying "no." In the paradoxical logic of worldly faith, the
"yes-to-the-world" is an affirmation via a double negation.

Francis Marion University

NOTES
1. See Stephen Dunning, Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Inwardness: A Structural Analysis
of Stages (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp.8-9. Dunning distinguishes
between the dialectics of contradiction, reciprocity, paradox, and mediati~n. I adopt his
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definition of the dialectic of paradox as the mode of thinking most characteristic of
Kierkegaard, even though he argues that Kierkegaard also employs, more so than even
Kierkegaard acknowledged, the more Hegelian dialectic of mediation.
2. Soren Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death: A Christian Psychological Exposition
for Upbuilding and Awakening edited and translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H.
Hong with Introduction and Notes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980).
[Hereinafter cited as SUD] Kierkegaard has Anti-Climacus say here: " ... to be able to
despair is an infinite advantage [to faith] ... "(SUD,IS); " ... Precisely because the sickness
of despair is totally dialectical, it is the worst misfortune never to have had that sickness;
it is a true godsend to get it..."(26); [for despair is] " ... the first element of faith ... "(78);
" ... if a person is truly not be in despair, he must at every moment destroy the possibiJity... "(IS).
3. Either/Or (Vols. I & II) edited and translated by Howard V. and Edna H. Hong, with
Introduction and Notes (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987). [Hereinafter
cited as ElO.] Here Author A puts the dialectic as follows: "But when sensuality is viewed
under the qualification of spirit, its significance is seen to be that it is to be excluded, but
precisely because it is to be excluded it is defined as principle, as a power, for that which
spirit, which is itself a principle, is supposed to exclude must be something that manifests
itself as a principle, even though it does not manifest itself as a principle until the moment
when it is excluded" (E/O 1,61).
4. Anti-Climacus remarks: "Yet every moment that a self exists, it is a process of
becoming, for the seIL.[in potentiality] does not actually exist, is simply that which ought
to come into existence. Insofar, then, as the self does not become itself, it is not itself; but
not be a self is precisely despair" (SUD,30). And earlier he has said: " The possibility of
this sickness [despair, i.e., not being a self] is man's superiority over the animal; to be
aware of this sickness is the Christian's superiority over the natural man; to be cured [i.e.,
to be a self before God in faith] of this sickness is the Christian's blessedness ... Consequently, to be able to despair [to be aware that one has no self] is a great advantage ... "(SUD,IS) [in the process of becoming a self].
S. See, for example, Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, Second
Edition (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984). He says, e.g., that " ... the
doctrine of El1ten-Eller is plainly to the effect that the principles which depict the ethical
way of life are to be adopted for 110 reason, but for a choice that lies beyond reasons, just
because it is the choice of what is to count as a reason" (42).
6. Since the following note plays so large a part in my interpretation here, I will quote
the full text: "Note that here despair over sin is dialectically understood as pointing toward
faith. The existence ofthis dialectic must never be forgotten (even though this book deals
only with despair as sickness); in fact, it is implied in despair's also being the first element
in faith. But when the direction is away from faith, away from the God-relationship, then
despair over sin is the new sin. In the life of the spirit, everything is dialectical. Indeed,
offense as annulled possibility is an element in faith, but offense directed away from faith
is sin. That a person never once is capable of being offended by Christianity can be held
against him. To speak that way implies that being offended is something good. But it must
be said that to be offended is sin (SUD,116n, italics added).
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7. My reading of the pseudonymous authorship has it that it is Kierkegaard himself that
speaks indirectly through his fictitious authors. Although we can articulate no explicit
technique for sorting out his voice from the pseudonyms, we can, I submit, discern SK's
voice, his presence, his point, if we so attune ourselves to his philosophical agenda.
8. Fear and Trembling/Repetition Edited and Translated by Howard V and Edna H.
Hong with Introduction and Notes (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983).
[Hereinafter cited as Fr.]
9. In other places I have called this paradoxical relation of the self to the world a
sunderedlbonded relation. See, Word and Spirit: A Kierkegaardian Critique of the Modern
Age (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993).
10. See Stephen Crites "Pseudonymous Authorship as Art and as Act," in Kierkegaard:
A Collection of Critical Essays, edited by Josiah Thompson (Garden City, New York:
Doubleday Anchor Books, 1972) where he says: " .. .in certain respects one best grasps the
intent behind the notion of the stages in reducing the scheme to the distinction between
the aesthetic and the existential, regarding the ethical and religious as existential discriminations" (p.202).
11. See Martha Nussbaum's excellent article "Transcending Humanity" in Love's
Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature (New York: Oxford University Press,
1990), pp.365-391.
12. Anthony Rudd Kierkegaard and the Limits of the Ethical (New York: Clarendon
Press Oxford, 1993).
13. For an interpretation along these lines see Edward F. Mooney Knights of Faith and
Resignation: Reading Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling, (Albany, N.Y.: State University
Press of New York, 1991).
14. "Yet Abraham had faith, and had faith for this life. In fact, if his faith had been only
for a life to come, he certainly would have more readily discarded everything in order to
rush out of a world to which he did not belong. But Abraham's faith was not of this sort ... "
(Fr,20 italics added).
15. This would have made faith into nothing essentially different than infinite resignation insofar as in the latter " ... there is peace and rest" (Ff,45).
16. Louis Mackey, Kierkegaard: A Kind of Poet (Philadelphia: The University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1971), p.86.
17. I Think that Kierkegaard has in mind here something like the situation in Aeschylus's Agamemnon wherein Agamemnon is required to sacrifice his daughter Iphigenia.
Agamemnon is on an expedition commanded by Zeus and it is his pious duty to fulfill
that mission. Yet the expedition is halted when the seas are becalmed. A prophet tells
Agamemnon that the only way that the mission can be resumed is by the sacrifice of his
daughter. For the sake of his civic and pious duty, Agamemnon does the deed. Here the
principle of duty swallows up this individual child-and moreover without any real fear
and trembling on Agamemnon's part. See Martha Nussbaum's discussion of this story in
The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp.33-39.
18. See William H. Poteat's excellent treatment of this theme in "The Absence of God,"
The Hibbert Journal LV (1956-57), pp. 115-123. Commenting on T.S. Elliot's Cocktail
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Party he says of Lavinia Chamberlayne's abrupt leaving of her husband Edward: "" .Edward is shattered by her departure, not so much, it would appear, because he has lost face,
but because of the profoundly disturbing discovery that Lavinia is an 'otherness that can
say "I"".Lavinia absents herself, and by so doing presents herself as an unfathomable
person, with depths which have been forgotten or ignored by Edward."
19. See Stanley Cavell Pursuits of Happiness: The Hollywood Comedy of Remarriage
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981). In his analysis of "The Awful Truth"
he says of the leading male: "As long as he can choose he is free-free for example to
choose faithfulness. This would be creating a logical space within marriage in which to
choose to be married, a way in which not to feel trapped in it" (p.245).
20. Kierkegaard's critique of the universal is always, I contend, a critique of the
abstract universal. What I mean to convey by the "abstract" qualification is the idea of
the universal as a set of general principles fixed in advance of any particular case. There
is room for the universal in a Kierkegaardian ethico-religious life, but given the priority
of the particular in Kierkegaardian faith, that universal is always concrete. The concrete
universal moves. in an opposite direction from the abstract universal of an aesthetico-ethical ethics. In faith, particular sound ethical judgments are universalizable to be sure, but
they are not sound because they instantiate some general ethical principle. See Martha
Nussbaum on this point in Love's Knowledge, op. cit., p.38.

